Field notes
Writing from the edge of the synthetic-media problem.
Each post is grounded in what the dfpn protocol actually does — no benchmark theatre, no marketing-speak, no implied partnerships. If a claim is not in the repo, it is not on this page.
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Reading dfpn's threat model: what is in scope and what isn't
A close read of the dfpn threat model. Six adversary classes, the protocol mitigations paired with each, the trust assumptions named explicitly, and the things dfpn deliberately does not try to do.
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Why a decentralized validator network matters for synthetic-media attestation
Detection-as-a-service from a single vendor is brittle for civic infrastructure. A decentralized validator network gives you detector diversity, censorship resistance, and an audit trail that no operator can quietly rewrite.
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Provenance vs detection: two complementary lines of defense
Provenance and detection sit at different points in a media lifecycle. Provenance answers 'where did this come from?' at capture time; detection answers 'does this look manipulated?' after the fact. Both are needed; neither is enough on its own.
provenancedetectionc2pa